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 Purpose:The growing debate on the board of director mechanisms to firm 
performance will for a long time remain area of research. The effectiveness 
of the board of director composition, responsibility, and accountability have 
become an area of research in the recent trend. This paper attempts to 
investigate the empirical study of the relationship between the board of 
director mechanisms and perceived performance of listed firms in Nigeria. 
The underpinning theory of the paper is rooted in agency theory and 
supported by resource dependence theory, and stewardship theory to 
increase the understanding of the influence of the board of director 
formation to perceived firm performance. The questionnaires were 
administered to the respondents, out of 182 questionnaires administered, 
117 were returned. The number of valid questionnaires is 114. The data 
were analyzed using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling 
(PLS-SEM). Empirical findings showed that board of director composition 
and accountability were positively associated with perceived firm 
performance. While the board of director responsibility has no relationship. 
Based on the knowledge of this paper, this is the first study that adopts the 
use of primary data to investigate the empirical study of the relationship 
between the board of director mechanisms and perceived performance of 
listed firms in Nigeria. The findings provide policymakers, stakeholders, 
and government with the approaches to overcome and resolved the conflict 
of interest between the board of director (agent) and shareholder (principal). 
The paper also offers some suggestions for future study. 
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1. Introduction  
The recent debate on the performance of insurance firm will for a long time remain an area of interesting 
research. The scandals in the early 1990‘s has exposed many multinational firms in the United Kingdom 
and United States with a high-profile corporate scandals, unexpected corporate failures, unprofessional 
behaviours by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and management (Adegbite, 2015; Al-matari, 2014; 
Ehikioya, 2009; Harvey Pamburai, Chamisa, Abdulla & Smith, 2015; Rossi, Nerico&Capasso, 2015; 
Nuhu& Ahmad, 2017; Samaduzzaman, Zaman &Quazi, 2015). It has been suggested that the scandals at 
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Enron, WorldCom, Qwest, Tyco and other corporate entities in the US resulted in a loss of more than 
USD 7 trillion of investors‘ funds (Donaldson, 2003; Global Issue, 2009; Lawal, 2012). The estimated 
value of the Lehman Brothers scandals and other giant corporate entities stood at USD 14.5 trillion 
(Global Issue, 2009; Lawal, 2012). 
 
The manipulation of financial statement by many listed firms in Nigeria has created a bottleneck between 
the manager (agent) and the owners (principal). This has to lead to the collapsed of notable leading high 
profile listed firms and others financial institutions in Nigeria such as Finbank, Bank PHB, Bank of the 
North, Afribank, Oceanic Bank and Intercontinental Bank among others. This is as a results of lack of 
Corporate Governance (CG) practices, corruptions in the system, reckless loan provision, loans given to 
family member without paying back, bad debt, unethical banking practices, including the inflation of 
revenue, the distortion and manipulation of financial statement, diversion of bank funds and granting of 
unsecured credit facilities without proper authorization were is still found operating in the insurance firm 
and others financial services in Nigeria (Central Bank of Nigeria 2011; Sanusi, 2012). This was the time 
when the market capitalization of Nigeria dropped significantly from N12 trillion to N9 trillion (Adamu, 
2009). 
 
Consequences, prior studies contended that the collapse of major corporate institutions in both developed 
and developing economies are attributed to lack of corporate governance practice that found many 
institutions with guilty of financial manipulation and distortion of funds (Avgouleas, 2008; Lawal, 
2016Adamu, 2009). In modern practice, managers often pursued their interest rather than the interest of 
their owners (Berle& Means, 1932; Lawal, 2012). The above school of thought argued that every 
successful firmneeds to put in place a mechanism that will help in resolving agency problem or conflict of 
interest that exist between the shareholders and managers. While other study contended that the size of the 
board of directors is seen as the most paramount important in corporate governance mechanism (Fama& 
Jensen, 1983; Hermalin&Weisbach, 2003; Johl et al, 2015). Hence, each shareholder wants their 
representation on the board of directors of every firm especial in the Nigeria setting or context due to a 
conflict of interest between the owner and the manager (Nuhu& Ahmad, 2016). The research on the issue 
of agency problems between manager and shareholder (principal and agent) will for a long time remain a 
topic of debate. Therefore, the issue of count head or a number of peoples or directors on the board might 
be new but the issues and challenges it addresses are not (Ayuso&Argandoǹa, 2007; Lawal, 2016; Lawal, 
2012). 
 
The objectives of this paperare to investigate the relationship between the board of director mechanisms 
and the perceived performance of listed firms in Nigeria with the view of the new focus of 
methodological approach and underpinning theory. This paper is divided into; introduction, literature 
reviews, methodology, results, discussion, conclusion, and recommendations for future research. 
 
2. Literature Reviews 
2.1.1 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
The word,Governance is a term derived from Greek-Latin word gubernare, which translates as the act of 
steering that was first used in a metaphorical by Plato. The steering is an institution of the state through 
the creation of enabling conditions for the enforcement of the rule of law and collective decision making 
(Rampersad& Hussain, 2014; Robichau, 2011; Solomon, 2007). Initially, governance was synonymous 
with the management of political/social units, specifically government institutions. This notion has now 
transcended from the state focus into a market-based application with emphasis on the management of 
corporations, also known as corporate governance (Offe, 2009). The introduction of governance in the 
management of corporations was designed to mitigate unethical practices through the promotion of 
corporate transparency and accountability (Cadbury, 2000). Corporate governance had been defined in 
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many ways by different researchers, authors, institutions, industries, etc. The concept of corporate 
governance itself has undergone a series of transformations. 
 
Corporate governance is a concept that represents the entire system by which companies are directed and 
controlled by a board (Cadbury Report, 1992). Therefore, in finance and management terminology, 
corporate governance is to solve what is called the problem of the agency which exists between 
stockholders or shareholders and managers. Therefore, that is what corporate governance is intended to 
resolve in making sure investors get their investment back, given that somebody else (managers or agents) 
will make ensure that all the decisions making process about how their investment or their money have 
utilized (Akinkoye&Olasanmi, 2014; Lawal, 2012; Lawal, 2016). Good Corporate Governance promotes 
the efficient and effective use of the capital within the company or firms and their return on their capital 
or resources (Tai, 2015). Corporate governance mechanisms have been identifying as method or 
techniques used in determining the success and outcome of every firm performance (Adjaoud et al, 2007; 
Clarke, 2007; Guerra et al, 2009; Lawal, 2016). Hence, this section reviews the prior relationship between 
the following; corporate transparency and accountability and firm performance; corporate behavior and 
firm performance and shareholder rights and firm performance. 
 
2.1.2 Board of Director and Firm Performance 
The board of directors, as an internal monitoring mechanism, is designed in line with the agency doctrine 
to oversee how the executive team manages the firm in the absence of direct participation from the 
shareholders (Adjaoudet al., 2007; Heracleous, 2001). The introduction of the board as part of a firm‘s 
governance equation is aimed at ensuring accountability and reducing the moral hazard associated with 
the delegation of authority. Shareholders relinquish some of their decision-making rights to the 
constituted board that is now responsible for making strategic choices in a way that protects the interests 
of the owners as well as possible (Molz, 2007). Bozec (2005), contended that the board of directors 
became a necessary variable in a firm‘s governance calculation because of the need to address the 
fundamental problem of corporate entities, the significant diffusion of ownership.  
 
Many debates on corporate governance, in both academia and practice, have focused on the board of 
directors (Berghe&Levrau, 2004). Often regarded as the most significant constituency in firm governance, 
the corporate board plays an intermediary role that links the firm and its owners with those who provide 
professional management and other ancillary support services (Bozec, 2005; Chen et al., 2009). The board 
of directors shoulders the majority of a firm‘s management tasks (Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009). Apart from 
being saddled with the responsibility of stopping executive extremes, the board is the final or ultimate 
decision-making body through which the fate of the corporation is discussed and determined (Adjaoudet 
al., 2007; Fama& Jensen, 1983; Yawson, 2006). 
 
Because of the renewed focus on the internal governance of corporations, discussion on corporate 
governance has shifted to the functions of the board of directors (Heracleous, 2001; Jonsson, 2005; Ness 
et al., 2010; Stiles, 2001). The corporate board, as an internal mechanism, is expected to have a 
predetermined sense of purpose with clearly defined roles that facilitate the directors‘ effectiveness in 
carrying out their fiduciary responsibilities. Nicholson & Kiel (2004), argued that the role of the board 
varies across industries and countries and that a detailed understanding of these roles is critical in 
empirical studies on board structure. They observed that irrespective of the divergences, there are some 
key determinants of the ultimate role that the board of directors plays in the firm‘s governance. These 
factors include the institutional setting and the cognitive capabilities of the board members, as well as the 
degree of interference, are some of the essential determinants that shape the specific role of the corporate 
board (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004). 
 
Therefore, corporate governance encompasses every aspect of running a corporate entity, which amongst 
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other things includes the use of both internal board and external board mechanisms (Denis & McConnell, 
2003; Lawal, 2012; Solomon, 2007). The use of internal mechanisms represented by the board of 
directors stands out. Today, any discussion of corporate governance without the incorporation of the 
board of directors would seem out of place (Nordberg, 2011). Board of directors is considered as the main 
internal mechanism of CG which is designed to control management for dishonest behaviour tendency 
(Heracleous, 2001; Guan et al, 2007; Johl et al, 2015). Therefore, this paper review three of the board of 
director mechanisms (Board of Director Composition, Board of Director Responsibility and Board of 
Director Accountability) 
 
2.2.2.1 Board of Director Composition and Firm Performance 
In this paper, the board of director composition reflects the type of board membership (i.e. inside and 
outside director). Insider directors refer top management team or member that is employees of the firms 
or its subsidiaries. While Outside directors are grouped of director that are affiliated or non-affiliated 
(independent) in the company. Hence, affiliated directors are not members of the top management neither 
employees of the firm but have close links or relationship with the firm, as in the case of retired or former 
directors, executives or consultants. While non-affiliated directors are ‗independent‘ directors that are 
recruited to protect the interest of the shareholders. In theory, these non-affiliated or independent directors 
are not in any way under the control of the firm‘s executives. 
 
The ongoing debate on the board composition in recent research had shown how important it has 
influences board of directors, quality deliberation and decisions making process (Ahmadi &Bouri 2017; 
Lawal, 2016; Ngulumbu&Aduda 2016; Pearce & Zahra 1992; Rosenstein, 1987; Tashakori&Boulton, 
1985). Hence, the composition of the board has demonstrated the ability of the board of directors to 
exercise their controls over top management to avoid and protect shareholders‘ interests (Ahmadi &Bouri 
2017; Lawal, 2016; Ngulumbu&Aduda 2016; Pearce & Zahra 1992). Again, board composition has 
impacts on the directors‘ ability to offer and provide strategic direction that will influence firm 
performance (Pearce & Zahra 1992; Baysinger&Hoskisson, 1990; Nuhu& Ahmad, 2016). 
 
In the recent stream of research, board composition has been the topic and the subject of extensive 
investigation as a mechanism or determinant of the performance of a company, although, little is known 
and aware about the factors that influence and shape board composition (Ahmadi &Bouri 2017; Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1988; Lawal, 2016; Nuhu& Ahmad, 2016; Ngulumbu&Aduda 2016; Pearce & Zahra 
1992). Hence, there is a notable tradition of conceptual and research debate going on that boards of 
directors‘ composition can influence performance and variety of organizational outcomes (Ahmadi 
&Bouri 2017; Ngulumbu&Aduda 2016; Pearce & Zahra 1992). This attention has continued to be surface 
in the academic literature debate (Lawal, 2016; Ngulumbu&Aduda 2016; Dalton, Daily, Ellstranda& 
Johnson, 1998) 
 
Therefore, the rationale for any anticipated direction of the relationships between the board of director 
composition and firm performance will for a long time remain area of study. Hence, the previous scholars 
have distinguished that board of director reform activists has argued that any board of directors‘ should 
comprise predominantly, independent directors (Dalton et al., 1998; Ngulumbu&Aduda 2016; Pearce & 
Zahra 1992). Thus, many academic scholars have supported the same thought, but this paper hasprovided 
some alternative perspective in line with the current realities and debate (Ahmadi &Bouri 2017; Lawal, 
2016; Nuhu& Ahmad, 2016; Ngulumbu&Aduda 2016). However, the debate in the conceptual literature 
on the proportion of inside and outside directors on the board of director composition has become a topic 
of argument (Lawal, 2016; Nuhu& Ahmad, 2016; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
 
A favorite for dominate of the independent (non-executive) boards is supported by agency theory. The 
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agency theory believes on the notion that separation of ownership and control, have encouraged self-
interested actions by the managers (control) (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen &Meckling, 1976, Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). Agency theory argued that managers or agent are by virtue, have the company knowledge 
and expertise, that believed to have gained an advantage over company owners (principal) who did not 
partake from the operational aspects of the company (Mizruchi, 1988). Hence, Agency theory contended 
that as managers or agent gain control in the company, they are in a better position to pursue interests 
rather than the interest of the firm owners (Lawal, 2016; Nuhu& Ahmad, 2016). However, the possible 
conflict of interest between owner and agent have necessitated debate on the monitoring mechanisms that 
will protect shareholders or owners of the company (Ahmadi &Bouri 2017; Fama& Jensen, 1983; Jensen 
&Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1985). Thus, agency theory believed that effective board of directors 
should comprise of outside directors. The theory argued that independent (non-executive) directors mostly 
provide more and superior performance benefits to the shareholders and firm because of their 
independence from a firm insider or top management. 
 
Some empirical studies have supported agency theory position. Jizi (2017) have found outside or 
independent directors have positively associated with CSR disclosure among a sample of FTSE 350 firms 
for the period of 6 years in Lebanon. Ngulumbu and Aduda (2016) found that company with more 
independent or outside board are more reliable and satisfactory. Ahmadi and Bouri (2017) study the 
relationship between boards of directors‘ composition and performance in French CAC 40 listed firms. 
The found evidence that board composition is positively correlated to the firm‘ performance.Many other 
researchers or studies have registered a positive relationship between outside director and firm 
performance (Abdullah, Ismail & Jamaluddin 2008; Dal Vesco&Beuren 2016; Pearce & Zahra, 1992; 
Prencipe, 2016; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Vafeas and Vlittis, 2016). 
 
In another stream of theory, stewardship theory contended that managers or agent are inherently 
trustworthy, honest, commitment and are not found in the habit to misappropriate and mismanaged 
corporate resources (Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Lawal, 2016; Nuhu& Ahmad, 2016)). Hence, contended 
by Donaldson and Davis (1994 p.159) that stewardship theory has argued and supported that managers or 
agent are good stewards that work diligently to attain the objective of the company. However, this is quite 
opposite side of the agency theory. Thus, stewardship theory has suggested that the full control of the firm 
should be centralized in the hands of managers or agents (Davis, Schoorman& Donaldson, 1997). 
 
Consistent with stewardship theory, some researchers have found that inside directors were associated 
with higher firm performance. Rasmussen, Ladegård, and Korhonen-Sande (2016) found the positive 
influence of inside directors and company performance using survey data from 773 high-growth 
Norwegian firms by adopting ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method. Ganguli and Guha Deb 
(2016) found a positive relationship with inside director and firm performance. Kesner (1987) have also 
found a positive relationship between inside directors and returns to investors. However, there is another 
stream of research that has found no relationship at all between board composition and firm performance 
(Daily and Dalton, 1992; Galbreath, 2016; Ismail, Ahmad, &Shaffee, 2016). 
 
Hence, this overview has shown that there is little consistency in the research findings for the board of 
director composition and firm performance. However, the prior empirical research which has investigated 
the board composition and financial performance haveignored different methodological approach. 
Therefore, given the continuing research interest and empirical studies toward the conflicting argument on 
the relationship between board of director composition and firm performance, this paper, therefore, 
develop the following hypothesis; 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
There is a significant positive relationship between the board of director composition and the 
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performance of insurance listed firms in Nigeria. 
 
2.2.2.2 Board of Director Responsibility and Firm Performance 
The board of director main primary responsibility is to monitor top management on behalf of the owner or 
shareholders. Board of director responsibility is defined as the duties, role, functions, and activities in 
which directors carry out on behalf of stakeholders or owners. Hence, one of the primary and major 
responsibilities any board of directors is it public or private sector is to serve as a monitoring function 
(frame 1980; Fleischer, Hazard &Klipper, 1988). Boards of directors play an important key responsibility 
in corporate governance structures (Guerrero, Lapalme, Herrbach&Séguin, 2017). The board is entrusted 
or trusted with a diversity of complementary role, tasks and duties that make the director's responsibility 
more unique and complex in nature (Guerrero et al., 2017; Nuhu& Ahmad, 2016).  
 
Huse et al. (2011) contended that board members' identification of their responsibility is important in 
determining the process, direction and extent to which the monitoring function and monitoring behavior 
will be actualized. Hence, the board of directors is generally seen as a body that is responsible for 
ensuring adequate satisfaction of their different stakeholders‘ demands (Fuente, García-Sánchez, & 
Lozano, 2017; Gray et al., 1995; Prado-Lorenzo &García-Sánchez, 2010; Frías-Aceituno et al., 2012). 
The importance of every board of director's contribution to firm progress and success have for a long time 
been at the round table and center of the debate (Mullins &Schoar, 2016). A very number of recent 
research has demonstrated that board of director responsibility is the key determinant factor that shown 
how firms are being managed and perform (Bertrand &Schoar, 2003; Bennedsen, Neilsen, Pérez-
González &Wolfenzon 2007; Bandiera, Prat &Sadun, 2013; Mullins &Schoar, 2016).  
 
Some recent literature has pointed out the other important aspect of the directorfunctions for effective 
duties which is seen as a service/collaboration functions (Castro, Galán&Casanueva, 2016;He et al. 
2010). The stewardship theory has argued and challenges the logical that supported agency theory, that 
the responsibility of the board of director members do not collide with that of owner interest (Castro et al., 
2016; Muth& Donaldson 1998). Hence, the responsibility and role of any board are to assess, control and 
participate in the day to day strategic decisions making of the firm. Various recent studies have debated 
the relationship between director role and organizational performance in the literature (Castro et al., 2016; 
Heracleous 2001; Mullins &Schoar, 2016; Nuhu& Ahmad, 2016). Therefore, the impact of the boards of 
director responsibility in the performance of any firm is it private or public liability can occur or happen, 
either through the attributes of the board itself or through the functions or responsibility that it performs 
(Castro et al., 2016; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). However, in view of the roles, responsibilities or functions, 
boards performed, some recent researchers have argued out that the board commitment and they are active 
in the decision making will influence and impact directly on firm performance (Castro et al., 2016; 
Heracleous 2001; Mullins &Schoar, 2016; Nuhu& Ahmad, 2016; Ruigroket al., 2006). 
 
Therefore, the responsibility of the board of directors is one of the numerous institutions that have 
advanced and developed in recent modem corporations in order to resolve the agency conflict between 
management responsibility and the interest of the shareholders. But yet, the board of director effectiveness 
in fulfilling their responsibility is not clear. Thus, some researchers believe the board of directors 
generally fail in their role and responsibility to monitor top management due to collide of board and 
management against the interest of the company (American Law Institute, 1982; Dunn 1987; Guerrero et 
al., 2017; Hermalin&Weisbach, 1991; Mullins &Scholar, 2016). Others stream of research, however, 
argues that company reputation will lead and make the board of directors fulfill their responsibility, duty, 
and role (Fama 1980; Fama& Jensen 1983; Lawal, 2016; Nuhu& Ahmad, 2016). 
 
However, another empirical study (Melkumov et al., 2015) did not in any way yield conclusive results, 
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which observed the direct significant relationship between shareholder identification and board 
monitoring behavior tasks. One of the main reason for this result may be that the link between the 
director's identification with stakeholders and the monitoring is not a direct and linear but suggested by 
Huse et al. (2011, p.12), that concentrated on the identification positions of director‘s involvement in 
some specific roles. Hence, given the conflicting argument and philosophy of the board of director 
responsibility and role to company performance, this paper, develop the following hypothesis; 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
There is a significant positive relationship between the board of director responsibility and the 
performance of insurance listed firms in Nigeria. 
 
2.2.2.3 Board of Director Accountability and Firm performance 
Board of director accountability was defined in this paper as bridging the gap between board 
commitments, task, and roles that are aligned with stakeholder expectations. In the early wake of 
corporate scandals that contributed to global financial and economic crisis in recent years, investors, 
policy makers, and others stakeholders have called for director‘s accountability to their shareholders 
(Naaraayanan& Nielsen, 2016). However, the accountability of boards to stakeholder expectation is 
regarded as a critical issue in promoting the performance every firm been it private or public sector (Keay, 
2016; Nuhu& Ahmad, 2016). The fact remains that board accountability is essential to shareholders and 
investors right. Hence, recent investigation has argued that board accountability is in relation to a number 
of elements that boards must first accept the responsibility and the need to be answerable to the 
shareholder's return (Keay, 2016). 
 
However, directors are mostly or rarely subject to lawsuits by their shareholders or stakeholders, and 
when they are found guilty in any cases, often are lead to dismissed (Adegbite 2015; Amour et al. 2009; 
Black et al. 2006; Brennan et al., 2016). Moreover, the incidences of voting and electoral is another 
challenge of directors who are infrequent, that indicating that owners rarely grip or hold directors very 
accountable by proposing replacement or alternative candidates or person to fill the vacuum or vacant for 
directorship position (Bebchuk, 2007; Choi et al., 2016). Thus, some researchers argued that directors 
infrequently are challenged particularly in a time of voting to replace directors following lawsuits and law 
enforcement action (Farber, 2005; Ferris et al. 2007; Kuyper &Bäckstrand, 2016; Torchia&Calabrò, 
2016). While another stream of research contended that, many directors are afraid of shareholders 
lawsuits, hence, will likely wish to rather leave boards to avoid punishment by shareholders (Aggarwal, 
Dahiya&Prabhala, 2015; Choi et al., 2016). Although, some independent directors or non-executive also 
found guilty thereafter lose their positions on the boards due to their selfish interest rather than defending 
or representing the interest of their shareholders by colluded with management for financial irregularities 
(Brennan et al., 2016; Choi et al., 2016; Gilson, 1990; Srinivasan, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; 
Ertimur et al., 2012). 
 
Hence, theoretically, to increase board accountability, there should be improved in directors‘ incentive 
and welfare to monitor affairs of management activities and reduce agency conflict and entrenchment 
(Naaraayanan& Nielsen, 2016). In another stream of argument, it can be contended that fear of legal 
accountability and liability could deter individuals director from serving on the board (Choi, Fisch, Kahan 
and Rock, 2016; Romano, 1989; Sahlman, 1990). In another hand, argued that insisting on board 
accountability make them risk averse and thus reduce the effectiveness of the board. Despite a rich 
literature on corporate directors, direct evidence of whether accountability deters individuals from serving 
on corporate boards is scant. 
 
The little previous literature found on director accountability has merely focused on examining whether 
Non-executive (independent) directors experience litigation risk or danger (Armour, Black, 
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Cheffins&Nolan, 2009; Black, Cheffins&Klausner, 2006; Brochet& Srinivasan, 2014). While other 
examining whether directors were held accountable for their action or wrong doing through 
shareholder/owner voting in director elections position (Cai, Garner & Walking, 2009; Fischer, Gramlich, 
Miller & White, 2009; Guercio, Seery&Woidtke, 2008). While other recent studies argued that directors 
are held accountable for mismanagement and corporate misfortunes through law enforcement or either 
through lawsuits (Brennan et al., 2016; Choi et al., 2016; Kuyper &Bäckstrand, 2016; Torchia&Calabrò, 
2016). Therefore, due to mixed argument on director accountability and scant literature for the fact that 
based on these paper literature knowledge no studies have link board accountability to firm performance, 
this paper, develop the following hypothesis; 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
There is a significant positive relationship between the board of director accountability and the 
performance of insurance listed firms in Nigeria. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
This paper is rooted in one theory and supported by two theoretical perspectives in investigating the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms/characteristics and the performance of insurance 
listed firms in Nigeria.Hence, there are numerous well-developed theories that are available to 
scholars/researchers to aid or exploring the concepts of corporate governance mechanisms. Though, these 
paper is rooted in Agency theory and supported by managerial hegemony theory, and stewardship theory. 
 
Agency theory has in recent time continue to gain the support of recent studies that were acknowledged as 
the major and dominant theory as against numerous other theories in corporate governance research 
(Aguilera et al., 2008; Johnson, 2008; Lawal, 2012; Nuhu& Ahmad, 2016; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Hence, 
agency theory is merely built on the believed and premise that separation of the owner from an agent will 
create a bottleneck between the two parties (Aguilera et al., 2008; Lawal, 2012). Therefore, agency theory 
model believed that separation of ownership (shareholder) and control (agent) creates a conflict of interest 
between and involves risk sharing between the two (Aguilera et al., 2008; Nuhu& Ahmad, 2016). Implicit 
in the belief that the manager or agent will be ambitious or driven by their self-interest rather than the 
interest of the owner (principal) (Lawal, 2012). Though managers or agent are seeing as a rational, they 
cannot be fully trusted to remain loyal and faithful for the best interest of their shareholder (principal) 
since the agent are also pursuing their self-interested (Padilla, 2002; Lawal, 2012). Hence, the board, are 
considered as an intermediary, that is expected to resolve the conflict of interest that exists between 
principal and agent (Nuhu& Ahmad, 2016). However, to address the conflicting interest or agency 
problem, between the owner and manager, the agency theory acknowledged the important role of the 
board of directors as mechanisms of owners (shareholders) in subduing the manager's actions (Lawal, 
2012; Stiles & Taylor 2001). 
 
The first supported theory is managerial hegemony, managerial hegemony theory is advocated that boards 
of directors are seeing and just a statutory additions that are full or dominated by the top management 
(Lorsch& MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971; Vance, 1983). Management hegemony believed that boards of the 
director only play a passive role in strategic decision making or directing the corporation (Lorsch& 
MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971; Vance, 1983). While the second supported theory is stewardship theory, that 
postulates or assumes that managers are intrinsic or motivated to accomplish the job before them or a 
desire to achieve target goal or objective to the company (Lawal, 2012; Donaldson &Muth, 1998) in 
gaining intrinsic satisfaction and motivation by performing tasks before them. This theory argued that 
agent or managers need authority to pursue and desire recognition from their superiors (Riana, 2008). 
Hence, the board of director role and responsibility is a matter of strategy which is seen as contributing 
factor to this managerial perspective (Donaldson &Muth, 1998; Freeman, 1999; Gay, 2002; Hillman et 
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al., 2000; Johnson et al., 1996; Lawal, 2012; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007; Nuhu& Ahmad, 2016). 
 
Figure 1: Framework 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Methodology 
The used of questionnaires for this study were adopted from prior researchers. Self-administered 
questionnaires were carried out to examine the formulated and test hypotheses, using the total population 
of 283 board of directors of insurance firm listed in the Nigeria stock exchange as at January 2016 as 
respondents for this paper. Sample size determination using Krijcie and Morgan (1970) table were 
adopted which resulted in 165 sample for the study. Salkind (1997) suggested that addition of 10% or 
40% of the sample should be added to sample size to avoid low response rate. The ideas is to increase 
sample size with 10% so as to improve the response rate (Salkind, 1991). Thus, the high the response rate, 
the perfect the results (Salkind, 1991). Therefore, 10% of 165 is 16.5 approximately 17. Hence, 182 
questionnaires were randomly distributed among the target population (respondents) with help of Nigeria 
stock exchange and security and exchange commission. Thus, out of 182 questionnaires administered, 
117 were duly completed and returned. Although, it is a close-ended format questionnaires that based on 
5-point Likert scale of 1-5, where, 5 = strongly disagree, 4 = disagree, 3 = no idea, 2 = agree, 1 = strongly 
agree. Hence, out of 117 number of questionnaires duly completed and returned, which represents the 
response rate of 64.2857 percent (64 percent) of the study sample. 3 out of 117 questionnaires returned 
were invalid. Hence, the final number of 114 (63%) usable questionnaires were used for the analysis after 
thorough data screening. Furthermore, statistical software for social science (SPSS version 22) were first 
employed for data screening and preliminary analysis while Smart PLS 2.0 software was used to 
conducted or carry out the partial least squares (PLS) analysis (Nasiru&KeatOoi, 2015; Olusegun, 
Ashari&Nordin  2014; Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005). 
 
5. Results 
The study adapted measurement from the work of Okpara, (2011) for board of director composition; 
Ammann, Oesch and Schmid (2011) for board of director accountability; Okpara, (2011) for board of 
directors‘ responsibilities; Rettab et al (2009) for firm performance.The analysis of demographic 
characteristics of the respondents is as follow: in term of gender; male dominated by 85.09 percent 
(N=97) as against females with only 14. 91 percent (N=17). With regard to the position of the 
respondents, chairmen 1.75 percent (N=2), chairperson 2.63 percent (N=3), managing director/chief 
executive officer 15.75 percent (N=18), directors more than 59.65 percent (N=68), while independent 
director 14.91 percent (N=17), secretary 1.75 percent (N=2) and others 3.51 percent (N=4) more than half 
(55 percent; N=128) were from urban areas compared to 45 percent (N=107) who were known or called 
by another name on the boards. For the age of the respondent; between the age of 31-40 are 29.80 percent 
(N=38), 41-50 age are 51.7 percent (N=56), while 51-60 fall on 17.70 percent (N=14) and 61 and above 
0.8 percent (N=6). For education or qualification, the respondent with Ph.D.is 5.26 percent (N=6), while 
Board of Director 
Composition 
Firm Performance 
Board of Director 
Accountability 
 
Board of Director 
Responsibility 
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the majority of the respondents have master degree with 66.67 percent (N=76), and 28.07 percent (N=32) 
have B.Sc and other qualifications. Also, for the number of board the director is presently serving, the 
majority of the respondent of 92.98 percent (N=106) are serving only in one board of director of a firm, 
while 6.14 percent (N=7) are serving in two board of director while 0.88 percent (N=1) serving in three 
board of director. 
 
The study adopted and use Smart PLS 2.0 software in the tested model by conducting partial least square 
(PLS) analysis (Ringle et al., 2005). As recommended, in determining the study minimum sample size is 
by multiplying the number of the arrows or highest arrows pointing to dependent variable or to a 
particular endogenous construct by 10 (Barclay, Higgins & Thompson, 1995; Nasiru&KeatOoi, 2015). 
Hence, in the case of this study, we have one dependent variable (endogenous construct) with three 
arrows pointing or directly at it, that signifying a least of a sample size of 30 would be sufficient and 
enough for the study analysis. In addition, as suggested and recommended that if the G*power analysis is 
employed, 112 observations are required in order to attain a statistical power (G*power) of 95 percent for 
detecting R² values of at least 0.21 (5 percent probability of error) (Hair, Hult, Ringle&Sarstedt, 2014). 
Therefore, given the 114 returned and usable questionnaires/participants, it is, therefore, believed that 
Smart PLS is the most appropriate tool/technique to be used in testing this study direct hypotheses. 
 
6. Measurement Model 
The convergent and discriminant validity was used in this study to test and check for the adequacy of the 
items or indicators in measuring the variable/construct that they are supposed to be at the right construct 
to measure. Hence, for the convergent validity (Bagozzi& Phillips, 1982; Nasiru&KeatOoi, 2015), the 
construct reliability, as well as indicators' reliability,were assessed (Nasiru&KeatOoi, 2015; Peter, 1981). 
Therefore, to examine the study indicators reliability, the loadings were performed and they were all 
above the threshold or recommended 0.7 (Hair et al., 2014) value parameter. Also, for the reliability and 
validity of the construct, composite reliability (CR) and the average variance extracted (AVE) were all 
examined. Hence, the composite reliability (CR) are all above 0.7 and the average variance extracted 
(AVE) are well above the recommended or threshold of 0.5 (Bagozzi& Yi, 1988; Hair et al., 2014). 
Precisely, the lowest composite reliability (CR) was 0.796 and the lowest average variance extracted 
(AVE) was 0.595. See Table 1 convergent validity. 
 
Table 1 
    
The Items loading, Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and Reliabilities 
Latent Variable Code Loadings AVE CR 
Board of Director Accountability BDA1 0.881 0.704 0.904 
 
BDA2 0.816 
  
 
BDA5 0.774 
  
 
BDA6 0.879 
  Board of Director Composition BDC10 0.545 0.595 0.876 
 
BDC11 0.892 
  
 
BDC5 0.608 
  
 
BDC8 0.819 
 
 
 
BDC9 0.917 
 
 
Board of Director Responsibility BDR2 0.748 0.663 0.796 
 
BDR4 0.876 
  Firm Performance FP5 0.913 0.833 0.909 
  FP6 0.912     
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In addition, the study also examined the cross-loadings of the construct items as well as the inter-construct 
correlation matrix with the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) across the diagonal in 
examining discriminant validity of the study constructs. Hence, the items below the threshold of 0.5 were 
deleted as recommended by Hair et al., (2014). Table 2 shown cross-loading of the item loads (shadowed) 
higher on its each respective constructs, this indicated that shadowed item loads implies discriminant 
validity. In Table 3, Fornell and Larcker (1981) contended that the square root of each reflective 
construct‘s average variance extracted (AVE) should be greater than any level of correlations involving in 
the construct. Therefore, the study model has met up as well as satisfied the threshold of validity and 
reliability criteria. Hence, the study could run to establish or determine the descriptive and structural 
modeling predictive power. The following shown Table 3 with an illustration of the descriptive for the 
study constructs in the model. 
 
Table 2 
      Latent Variable Correlations and Square Root of Average Variance Extracted (AVE), Mean and Standard Deviation 
Latent Variable BDA BDC BDR FP Mean Std. Dev. 
Board of Director Accountability (BDA) 0.704 
   
3.14 0.664 
Board of Director Composition (BDC) 0.305 0.595 
  
2.4 0.596 
Board of Director Responsibility (BDR) -0.175 -0.109 0.663 
 
2.5 0.547 
Firm Performance (FP) 0.578 0.476 -0.067 0.833 2.74 0.522 
Note: The values in bold are the square root of AVE across diagonal and off-diagonal are the correlation among the 
latent variables 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Measurement Model 
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Figure 2. Structural Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.330 (7.030) 
 
                                            .055 (.679)        
 
                                                                 .490 (7.315)        
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Validated Structural Model 
 
Figure 3, shown the validated structural model. The values in parentheses indicate t-values; solid lines 
indicate significant relationships (p < 0.01) respectively. The dotted line indicates no significant but 
positive relationship. 
 
  
BDA 
BDR 
BDC 
FP 
R²=.437 
Journal of Accounting and Finance in Emerging Economies   Vol. 3, No 2, December 2017 
 
 
171 
 
 
Table 3 
      Structural Model Assessment (Hypothesis Test) 
Hypothesis Relationship 
beta 
value 
Std. 
Error 
t value p value Decision 
H1 BDC -> FP 0.330 0.047 7.030 0.000*** Supported 
H2 BDR -> FP 0.055 0.081 0.679 0.500 Not Supported 
H3 BDA -> FP 0.490 0.067 7.315 0.000*** Supported 
***P< .001 
 
7. Discussion 
The aim of this paper was to investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
firm performance of the insurance listed firms in Nigeria. It is postulated that corporate governance 
positively relatesto firm performance. In general, the finding of the study analysis has shown that the 
empirical supported the important role board of directors played to improving insurance listed firm 
performance (Lawal, 2016; Nuhu& Ahmad, 2017). Hence, there is a positive statistically significant 
relationship between the board of director composition and the performance of insurance listed firms in 
Nigeria. Therefore, the hypothesis one supported (β=.330; T value=7.030). The results of this findings are 
consistent with the prior findings (Armstrong, 2005; Auld &Gulbrandsen 2010; Krishnamurti&Sevic 
applied, 2013; Klapper& Love, 2004; Klomp&Haan, 2008; Zehir, Çınar&Şengül, 2016) who showed that 
the composition of board of director influence the performance of insurance firms. The result of 
hypothesis two showed not supported. The findings showed that there is no relationship between the 
board of director responsibility and the performance of insurance listed firms in Nigeria. Therefore, the 
hypothesis is not supported (β=.055; T value=0.679). This result is also consistent with the prior studies 
(Donaldson, 1999; Freeman, 1999; Gibson, 2000). That there is no statistically significant relationship 
between the board of director responsibility and the performance of insurance listed firms in Nigeria. 
Hence, in line with hypothesis three formulated, the results supported the hypothesis. The findings 
showedsignificant result between the board of director accountability and the performance of insurance 
firm in Nigeria (β=.490; T value=7.315). Previous studies are also consistent with these findings (Epstein 
et al., 2015; Gompers et al., 2003; Gómez-Bezares et al., 2016; Jiraporn& Ning, 2007). 
 
Therefore, from the overall findings of this study, two of the hypotheses showing significant positive 
relationships while one of the hypotheses showing no relationship. Hence, this study showed that board of 
director mechanisms (composition and accountability) influence the performance of insurance firm in 
Nigeria. The findings were anticipated to have significant positive to firm performance. For example, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988); Jizi (2017); Ngulumbu and Aduda (2016) and Lawal (2016) contended in 
their finding that poor performance is mostly caused by lack of implementations. Hence, these 
mechanisms or features or variables have shown the influence to the corporate performance. Therefore, 
this paper recommended that directors of directors (agent) should accountable to the shareholders 
(principal) improve the performance of the insurance firm. Again, the composition of the board of director 
should comprise CEO/managers/directors with integrity that will influence the performance of insurance 
company in Nigeria. The future researchers to improve on this study through new methodological and 
theoretical approaches. 
 
8. Conclusion and Future Researchers 
In this paper, numerous related variables of corporate governance to improved firm performance were 
being examined. Hence, the results of the paper analysis have indicated that the corporate transparency 
and accountability, shareholder rights are statistically significant except corporate behavior that has no 
relationship. There is need for improvement on the prior studies on corporate governance that have been 
relying on one theory or depended on one theory for so long particularly when investigating on the issue 
of corporate governance mechanisms to firm performance (Daily et al, 2003; Lawal, 2016; Hillman 
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&Dalziel, 2003; Jensen &Meckling, 1976; Johnson et al, 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). The inconsistency 
on the previous study has made it unthinkable for a single theory to suit and flow current research (Kiel 
&Nickholson, 2007). Also, there is a very urgent need for a change of models and more of observational 
studies to truly comprehend the significance of corporate board (Donaldson &Muth, 1998; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Jackling &Johl, 2009).  
 
Again, another important improvement of this paper is methodology over prior studies is the use of 
primary data as recommended by recent previous studies (Lawal, 2016; Johl et al, 2015; Nath, 2015), 
Corporate governance studies have depended on particular methodology and firm performance measures 
and not considering the way that the circumstance which stimulates the utilization of such approach, in 
any case, has gone out of date. In this manner can't longer track the variable to be anticipated. The time is 
a good fit for the utilization of extended methodology that took into account primary examination 
(Finegold et al., 2007; Lawal, 2016; Rechner& Dalton 1991). Advancement of performance measures as a 
new era of observational studies is starting to investigate another option of measuring corporate 
governance performance, for example, using the primary methodology and "Structural Equation 
Modeling-Partial Least Square (SEM-PLS) for analysis". These models have so far demonstrated a lot of 
guarantees (Peterson et al, 2012; Hair et al, 2013; Henseler 2012). Partial least squares structural equation 
modeling is a rigorous application that givesbetter results with a higher acceptance and long range 
planning researchers (Hair et al, 2013 p.12). 
 
Despite many years of corporate governance studies, the current findings are wholly asymmetrical with 
the majority of research originating from developing countries like US and UK together with others 
developed economies nation (Huse, 2007; Jackling &Johl, 2009; Johnson et al., 1996; 
Vafeas&Theodorou, 1998; Yermack, 1996;). There is an urgent requirement or need for developing and 
emerging economies like Africa, especially Nigeria in driving force where there is a slight of observation 
or empirical studies. Companies‘ level studies from developing nations, particularly those with the frail 
legitimate environment could be significant to the field of study (Klapper& Love, 2002). Over the 
previous year, lack of the adequate and sufficient documented studies from an African point of view, 
particularly the emerging economies like Nigeria has without a doubt impair the policy makers in forging 
suitable reason for enhanced corporate governance. A unified, consensus and harmonized code of best 
practice on the level of compliance and sanctions for non-compliance will improve the performance of 
insurance listed firms in Nigeria. 
 
The limitation of this paper, the study could not capture all the corporate governance mechanisms in 
predicting others variables that would influence or improvement firm performance. Therefore, the paper 
recommended that the future studies should extend by including others corporate governance variables 
such as board meeting, chief executive officer duality, diversity among others using primary data and 
other statistical techniques like AMOS-Structural Equation Modeling (AMOS-SEM). Thus, future 
research should also considermulti-group variable for future analysis which this paper could not capture 
and strategically employ demographic variables with various groups. 
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